echo "Replacing $adoc_file_to_replace"
for id_file in build/ids/*.id; do
id=$(basename $id_file | sed 's/\.id$//')
xref_page=$(cat $id_file)
if [[ "$adoc_file_to_replace" -ef "./docs/modules/ROOT/pages/$xref_page" ]]
then
echo " - Skipping same page refid $id "
else
text_file=$(echo $id_file | sed 's/\.id$/.text/')
default_text=$(cat $text_file)
sed -i -E "s%xref:${xref_page}#${id}\[\]%xref:${xref_page}#${id}[$default_text]%g" $adoc_file_to_replace
fi
done
done
Create SecurityMockMvcResultHandlers to define security related MockMvc ResultHandlers
Create a method to allow copying the SecurityContext from the TestSecurityContextHolder to SecurityContextHolder
Closes gh-9565
Replace all usages of OAuth2IntrospectionClaimNames with
the suggested OAuth2TokenIntrospectionClaimNames.
There does not appear to be any further usages of OAuth2IntrospectionClaimNames,
so it should be suitable for removal when appropriate in accordance with the
deprecation policy.
The OpaqueTokenAuthenticationProvider now propagates the cause of
introspection exceptions in the same way that the reactive
OpaqueTokenReactiveAuthenticationManager does.
Fixed a final field warning on both OpaqueTokenAuthenticationProvider
and OpaqueTokenReactiveAuthenticationManager.
It appears Nimbus does not check the presence of the Content-Type
header before parsing it in some versions, and since prior to this
commit, the code is .toString()-ing the result, a malformed response
(such as that from a misbehaving cloud gateway) that does not include
a Content-Type would currently throw a NullPointerException.
In addition to this, I have added a little more information to the
log output for this module on the standard and reactive implementations
to aid in debugging authorization/authentication issues much more
easily.
Prior to this commit, the OAuth2 resource server code is failing any issuer
that is not a valid URL. This does not correspond to
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#page-7 which redirects to
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.1, defining an
issuer as being a "StringOrURI", which is defined at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519#page-5 as being
an "arbitrary string value" that "MUST be a URI" only for
"any value containing a ':'".
The issue currently is that an issuer that is not a valid URL may be
provided, which will automatically result in the request being aborted
due to being invalid.
I have removed the check entirely, since while the claim could be invalid,
it is still a response that the OAuth2 introspection endpoint has provided.
In the liklihood that interpretations of this behaviour are different for
the OAuth2 server implementation in use, this currently stops Spring
Security from being able to be used at all without implementing a custom
introspector from scratch.
It is also worth noting that the spec does not specify whether it is
valid to normalize issuers or not if they are valid URLs. This may cause
other unintended side effects as a result of this change, so it is
safer to disable it entirely.
Rob Winch
heowc
bishoy basily
Josh Cummings
heqiang
Steve Riesenberg
Marcus Da Coregio
Eleftheria Stein
Ashley Scopes
Dmitriy Bogdanov